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MODERNIZING STATE VOTING LAWS THAT DISENFRANCHISE 
THE MENTALLY DISABLED WITH THE AID OF PAST SUFFRAGE 
MOVEMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the 
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must 
live.  Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined.  Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a 
way that unnecessarily abridges this right.1 
If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all 
things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in 
our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your 
answer. . . . It’s the answer spoken by young and old, rich and poor, Democrat 
and Republican, black, white, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, gay, straight, 
disabled and not disabled—Americans who sent a message to the world that 
we have never been just a collection of individuals or a collection of Red 
States and Blue States; we are and always will be the United States of 
America.2 
Justice Black’s and President Barack Obama’s words cited above implicate 
the power of voting in America’s democracy.  Their words highlight the dual 
nature of voting as an independent, personal right to express an opinion and as 
an opportunity to participate as part of a community, diverse yet united, in 
support of democracy.  The right to vote is one of the most basic 
representations of the core values the American Founders believed in when 
they devised the Constitution.3  Yet, even today, the right to vote is not 
universally extended to adult American citizens.4 
The states have the province to establish voter qualifications that are “not 
discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, 
 
 1. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964). 
 2. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Election Night Victory Speech in Grant Park (Nov. 4, 
2008), in N.Y. TIMES, November 5, 2008, at A1, available at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/ 
results/president/speeches/obama-victory-speech.html. 
 3. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17–18 (discussing the Founders’ conception of how important 
voting rights were). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B) (2006) (permitting states to remove an individual’s 
name from the eligible voter list “by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity”). 
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acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed.”5  Federal law 
specifically permits states to disenfranchise two classes of adults: convicted 
criminals and those with “mental incapacity.”6  While there are arguably public 
policy justifications for restricting the voting rights of criminals and the 
mentally disabled, any qualification or condition imposed on these individuals’ 
right to vote must pass a strict scrutiny constitutional analysis and comport 
with federal law.7 
This Comment focuses on the restricted voting rights of the mentally 
disabled and highlights the need to modernize over-inclusive state voting laws 
rooted in antiquated understandings of mental illness and general prejudice that 
disenfranchise the mentally disabled.  It briefly surveys the varying, current 
state voting laws that apply to the mentally disabled and outlines the strict 
scrutiny constitutional analysis applied to restrictive voting laws. 
Within the framework of the strict scrutiny test, the Comment addresses 
some common arguments in support of restricting mentally disabled 
individuals’ voting rights and reveals the arguments’ likeness to false 
arguments made in support of denying women the right to vote in the early 
twentieth century.  Also within the test’s framework, the Comment discusses 
the difficulty of defining a “capacity to vote” and the problem of 
discrimination facing the mentally disabled while highlighting parallels to the 
discrimination faced by African–Americans in the early to mid-twentieth 
century.  The women’s and African–American suffrage movements are 
historical examples that can help educate our understanding of the destructive 
effects of disenfranchisement and encourage individuals to seriously consider 
the merits of broadly restricting the mentally disabled from exercising the 
fundamental right to vote.8 
After identifying the difficulties states face in drafting a constitutional, 
restrictive voting law and the inaccuracies of common conceptions and stigma 
regarding the abilities of mentally disabled individuals, the Comment 
ultimately argues for broader voting rights for the mentally disabled.  The 
Comment endorses, in large part, a recent ABA recommendation that proposes 
taking away a mentally disabled individual’s right to vote only if a court finds 
 
 5. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B). 
 7. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51 (D. Me. 2001) (applying strict scrutiny 
analysis to a voting restriction against those under guardianship). 
 8. The author recognizes policy arguments disenfranchising women over eighty years ago 
do not provide perfect comparisons to arguments today disenfranchising the mentally disabled.  
Similarly, the discriminatory practices African–Americans faced that prevented their vote do not 
perfectly align with discrimination against the mentally disabled today.  But the underlying 
themes and societal impressions embodied in the policy arguments against allowing women the 
right to vote and the discriminatory practices against African–Americans are reflected today in 
the disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled. 
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by clear and convincing evidence the individual cannot communicate, with or 
without accommodation, a specific desire to participate in the electoral 
process.9  The Comment goes on to suggest that eliminating language that 
welcomes discriminatory discretion is vital to an improved standard and that 
federal governmental action may be necessary to ensure broader voting rights 
for the mentally disabled. 
Section I gives a brief evolution of social stigmas and prejudices at the root 
of original restrictive state voting laws, many of which still linger today.  It 
also reviews common aspects of various current state voting laws, including 
how some restrict the franchise.  Lastly, it outlines the strict scrutiny 
constitutional analysis courts apply to state laws that restrict voting rights of a 
particular class. 
Section II discusses the problems of defining a “capacity to vote” standard 
under the strict scrutiny requirements and in the face of discretionary 
discrimination when the standard is implemented.  It details the historical 
voting discrimination African–Americans faced and the policy enacted to fight 
it. 
Section III addresses common arguments against expanding voting rights 
for the mentally disabled and whether they implicate compelling state interests 
under the strict scrutiny analysis.  It also highlights the arguments’ similarities 
to early twentieth-century arguments against granting voting rights to women. 
Lastly, Section IV offers a policy recommendation to extend the franchise 
to a broader group of mentally disabled individuals.  It suggests mentally 
disabled individuals should be presumed able to vote and only lose the right if 
the individual cannot communicate, with or without accommodations, a desire 
to participate in the electoral process.  It also indicates effective reform may 
require federal action. 
I.  VOTING BARRIERS FACING THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE STRICT 
SCRUTINY CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. State Law Disenfranchisement 
United States history has been characterized by granting voting rights to 
increasing numbers of the population.10  Individuals with mental disabilities, 
however, remain one of the few groups singled out for disenfranchisement.11  
 
 9. See American Bar Association Recommendation and Report, from Symposium: 
Facilitating Voting as People Age: Implications of Cognitive Impairment 1 (Aug. 13, 2007), 
www.abanet.org/aging/docs/Voting_Rec_FINAL_approved.doc [hereinafter ABA 
Recommendation]. 
 10. Paul S. Appelbaum, “I Vote. I Count”: Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 51 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 849, 849 (2000). 
 11. Id. 
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As noted above, federal law specifically identifies convicted criminals and the 
mentally disabled as two classes a state can choose to disenfranchise.12  Most 
states restrict the franchise for certain mentally disabled individuals.13  Many 
of those state laws use antiquated, vague, or broad categorical language 
reflecting century-old prejudices and misconceptions about the abilities of 
mentally disabled individuals.14 
The current disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled stems from a 
history of “grotesque” societal treatment.15  In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, medical authorities portrayed the mentally disabled as a 
“menace to society and civilization” who were “responsible in a large degree 
for many, if not all, . . . social problems.”16  Large “institutions” were built to 
isolate the mentally disabled and prevent them from reproducing.17  Mentally 
disabled children were believed to be uneducable and dangerous.18  In the 
voting realm, politicians sought to exclude the mentally disabled based on a 
desire to ensure the voting public made “informed and intelligent political 
decisions.”19  In fact, “As of 1979, most States still categorically disqualified 
‘idiots’ from voting, without regard to individual capacity and with discretion 
to exclude left in the hands of low-level election officials.”20 
The vast majority of states today have constitutional provisions or statutes 
that deny certain mentally disabled individuals the right to vote.21  Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania are among the few states that do not 
disqualify any residents from voting based on a mental disability.22  Most 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B). 
 13. See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, STATE LAWS AFFECTING THE 
VOTING RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (2008), http://www.bazelon.org/pdf/ 
voter_qualification_chart6-08.pdf [hereinafter BAZELON STATE LAWS]. 
 14. See id.; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-12(a) (2008) (“No mentally incompetent person 
shall be admitted as an elector.”); HAW. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“No person who is non compos 
mentis shall be qualified to vote.”). 
 15. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 16. Id. at 462. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 462–63. 
 19. Leonard Holmes, Voting Laws Discriminate Against Mentally Disabled, Oct. 2000, 
http://mentalhealth.about.com/cs/legalissues/a/vote1000.htm [hereinafter Voting Laws 
Discriminate]. 
 20. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 464. 
 21. BAZELON STATE LAWS, supra note 10. 
 22. Id.; see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-412(3)(j) (2007) (allowing developmentally disabled 
individual to vote); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2006) (governing “Qualification of Voters”); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 12-26-2-8(a)(1)(F) (LexisNexis 2006) (“Detention or commitment of an individual 
under this article does not deprive the individual of . . . the right to . . . vote.”); 48 Pa. Op. Att’y 
Gen. 128 (1973) (“The mentally retarded or mentally ill cannot be disenfranchised merely 
because they are undergoing treatment for a mental disability.”).  An employee of the Illinois 
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states label ineligible individuals “mentally incompetent,”23 “non compos 
mentis,”24 or “of unsound mind.”25  But a number of state laws still include old, 
stigmatic terms such as “idiots” and “insane persons.”26 
The procedure to determine which mentally disabled individuals may and 
may not vote varies widely by state.  In Florida, all individuals placed under 
guardianship27 must be evaluated for voting disqualification.28  In other words, 
Florida residents under guardianship are categorically presumed not capable to 
vote.  In Hawaii, a “clerk” must investigate whether a person deemed 
“incapacitated . . . lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or 
communicate responsible decisions concerning voting” before the person 
retains his or her right to vote.29  In Iowa, a court must decide whether each 
individual under guardianship “lacks sufficient mental capacity to comprehend 
and exercise the right to vote.”30  Lastly, in California, a court must find that an 
 
Cook County Clerk’s office noted, “Voting is a personal right and we don’t erect any prohibitions 
[related to mental capacity].”  Erin G. Edwards, Group Pushes Voting Rights for Mentally 
Impaired, Jan. 15, 2008, http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=74603. 
 23. DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-12(a) (2008). 
 24. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. II, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 25. BAZELON STATE LAWS, supra note 10; see, e.g., MONT. CONST. art IV, § 2. 
 26. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (disqualifying “insane or not mentally competent”); 
MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (“Idiots and insane persons [are not] qualified elector[s].”).  
Interestingly, Kentucky differentiates between the terms “incompetent” and “insane,” noting an 
incompetent person can register to vote as long as the person has not been declared insane.  KY. 
CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (“Idiots and insane persons shall not have the right to vote.”).  Also, 
Vermont’s Constitution is particularly unique requiring that persons must be of “quiet and 
peaceable behavior” to be able to vote.  VT. CONST. ch. II, § 42. 
 27. A “guardian” is “one who has the legal authority and duty to care for another’s person or 
property.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed. 2004).  A guardian may be appointed to a 
mentally disabled individual for all or for specific decision-making purposes.  Id. 
 28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331(3)(d)(2) (West 2005). 
 29. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-23(a) (LexisNexis 2006).  In a unique provision that 
requires “understand[ing],” all Wisconsin residents must be able to “understand[] the elective 
process” in order to vote.  Id.  All Wisconsin residents are presumed to have this understanding 
except those under guardianship.  WIS. STAT. § 6.03(3) (2009).  A court must “expressly” find an 
individual under guardianship capable of understanding the elective process.  Id. § 6.03(1)(a).  
New Jersey also has an understanding requirement that was instituted as part of a 2007 
constitutional amendment.  N.J. CONST. art 2, § 1, ¶ 6. 
 30. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.556 (West 2003).  Delaware law also requires a court finding to 
take away the right to vote.  DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 15, § 1701 (2007).  It defines “adjudged 
mentally incompetent” as “a specific finding in a judicial guardianship or equivalent proceeding, 
based on clear and convincing evidence that the individual has a severe cognitive impairment 
which precludes exercise of basic voting judgment.”  Id. 
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individual under conservatorship31 cannot complete a voter registration 
affidavit before taking away the individual’s right to vote.32 
This brief review of current state voting laws reveals many laws contain 
vague terms and sweeping categorizations and require individual voting 
officials to make difficult discretionary determinations.  Recent referenda to 
amend older state voting laws have mostly failed.33  As a result, many current 
voting laws play a role in perpetuating prejudices, stigmas, and misconceptions 
that were at the root of the original state voting prohibitions.34  Yet, most of 
these impressions do not reflect the current, widely accepted medical 
understandings of the capabilities of many mentally disabled individuals.35  
Furthermore, the laws’ vagaries and broad categorizations threaten the laws’ 
constitutionality under a strict scrutiny analysis. 
B. Strict Scrutiny Constitutional Framework 
In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,36 the Supreme 
Court stated the federal Constitution “established and guaranteed” the right to 
vote.37  But the Court also asserted the individual states have the power to 
establish voting standards as long as they are not discriminatory and do not 
contravene any congressionally-made law.38 
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,39 the Supreme Court 
announced for the first time it would apply a strict scrutiny test when it 
assessed the constitutionality of a law limiting an individual’s right to vote.40  
The Court stated, “[O]nce the franchise [to vote] is granted to the electorate, 
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”41  The Court also recognized the 
evolving nature of the Constitution stating, “[T]he Equal Protection Clause is 
not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.  In determining what 
 
 31. A “conservator” and a “guardian” are synonymous as are a “conservatorship” and a 
“guardianship.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (8th ed. 2004). 
 32. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2008, 2209 (West 2003). 
 33. Voting Laws Discriminate, supra note 16.  One notable judicial exception is Doe v. 
Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001), where the court found a Maine constitutional 
provision categorically denying voting rights to individuals under guardianship unconstitutional 
under a strict scrutiny analysis.  Id. 
 34. Holmes, supra note 19. 
 35. Kay Schriner et al., The Last Suffrage Movement: Voting Rights for Persons with 
Cognitive and Emotional Disabilities, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 75, 88 (1997). 
 36. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 37. Id. at 51. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 40. Id. at 670; see Demian A. Ordway, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a 
Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174, 1176 (2007). 
 41. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665. 
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lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to 
historic notions of equality, . . . .  Notions of what constitutes equal treatment 
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”42  Noting the right to 
vote is “precious” and “fundamental,” the Harper Court ruled, “[W]here 
fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, 
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized 
and carefully confined.”43 
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,44 the Court more clearly 
outlined the requirements of the Equal Protection strict scrutiny test and 
reasons why the test applied to voting laws.45  The Court set out the first part of 
the test stating: “[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some 
bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to 
others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to 
promote a compelling state interest.”46  Subsequently, the Court articulated the 
second part of the test stating that the “classification” of those excluded from 
voting “must be tailored so that the exclusion of [those individuals] is 
necessary to achieve the articulated state goal.”47  The Court went on to 
explain the reason the strict scrutiny test applied to restrictive voting laws: 
[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is 
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement 
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.  
This careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the 
franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society.  Any 
unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political 
affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of 
representative government.48 
In Dunn v. Blumstein,49 the Court further delineated its Equal Protection 
strict scrutiny analysis into three primary foci: (1) “the character of the 
classification in question;” (2) “the individual interests affected by the 
classification;” and (3) “the governmental interests asserted in support of the 
classification.”50 
 
 42. Id. at 669 (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. at 670. 
 44. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 45. Id. at 626. 
 46. Id. at 627 (emphasis added). 
 47. Harper, 383 U.S. at 632 (emphasis added).  The Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, described 
this part of the test stating, “Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
‘precision,’ and must be ‘tailored’ to serve their legitimate objectives.” 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) 
(citations omitted). 
 48. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted). 
 49. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 50. Id. at 335. 
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In sum, to pass an Equal Protection strict scrutiny test and be found 
constitutional, state laws that classify certain individuals ineligible to vote must 
be necessarily or narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest.51  
Furthermore, if the state’s goals can be achieved in other reasonable ways that 
lessen the voting restrictions, the state must implement the less restrictive 
option.52  It is essential to know the high burden states must meet to 
disenfranchise a class of voters in order to fairly analyze the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of state voting laws restricting the voting rights of the mentally 
disabled. 
II.  NARROWLY TAILORING THE DEFINITION OF CAPACITY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF DISCRIMINATION 
This section analyzes specific issues that arise when the strict scrutiny 
standard is applied to voting laws restricting the rights of the mentally 
disabled.  First it explains the difficulty of defining the “capacity” one must 
possess to be able to vote.  Second, it points out that a well-defined, narrowly 
tailored capacity standard may pass constitutional scrutiny but is vulnerable to 
discretionary discrimination by individuals implementing the standard.  The 
voting discrimination faced by African–Americans during the early and 
middle-twentieth century provides a useful parallel to discrimination against 
the mentally disabled and a guide for how the discrimination problem has been 
mitigated in the past. 
A. Defining the Capacity to Vote—An Exercise in Policy, Not Science 
Defining what it means to be capable to vote is a major difficulty 
embedded in most state voting laws.  As already discussed, most states are 
sufficiently concerned about mentally disabled voters that they have passed 
voting laws with capability standards.53  Yet, a broad standard will likely result 
in over-inclusion and be unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny test.54  Thus, 
states must develop a standard that satisfies their interests in restricting the 
franchise while avoiding over inclusion as much as possible. 
Throughout the legal system, capacity standards vary by area of law and 
the function regulated, resulting in individuals being “legally capable” of 
 
 51. See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text. 
 52. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
 53. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.  However, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana and 
Pennsylvania have avoided the “capacity” policy dilemma by not restricting voting rights based 
on mental disability.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text explaining the utmost importance of 
preserving an individual citizen’s right to vote. 
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performing certain functions but not others.55  The particular level of capacity 
required to perform a certain legal function often depends on the type of 
transaction involved or the nature of the decision-making authority required.56  
For example, a person can be placed under guardianship when deemed 
incapable of entering into various transactions but still retain the legal authority 
“to exercise certain core decision-making authority” without further court 
rulings.57 
In essence, defining the criteria for “voting capacity” is an exercise in 
policy, not science.58  There is “no scientifically determinable point” on the 
spectrum of people’s capacities where one can say a person has sufficient 
capacity to vote.59  Thus, when a state establishes a capacity requirement, it 
should reflect “the importance of allowing persons to perform the task even in 
the face of some degree of impairment, tallied against the weight of concerns 
regarding the possible adverse outcomes of the task if performed by someone 
whose capacity may be impaired.”60  This is essentially a determination of how 
to allocate the risk of error.61 
In the context of restricting the right to vote, the Supreme Court in Kramer 
succinctly conveyed the utmost importance of preserving an individual’s right 
to vote.62  Meanwhile, it has been argued that any harm in allowing marginally 
incapable people to vote is small compared to the harm of preventing capable 
people from exercising their fundamental right to vote.63  Support for this 
claim comes from studies showing a substantial portion of Americans’ political 
discourse circumvents the conscious mind altogether.64  Indeed, “a range of 
irrelevant factors and fortuities—such as a candidate’s height, whether he uses 
a nickname, or the format of the ballot” drive many citizens’ political views 
and choices.65 
 
 55. Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of Autonomy 
and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2003).  Standards regulating capacity 
are not monolithic—just because one does not have the capacity to contract does not mean the 
individual cannot write a will or refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.  Id. at 323. 
 56. Id. at 325. 
 57. Id. at 325–26. 
 58. Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The 
Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 962 (2007). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Steven J. Schwartz, Abolishing Competency as a Construction of Difference: A 
Radical Proposal to Promote the Equality of Persons with Disabilities, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 867, 
871–72 (1993). 
 64. Pamela S. Karlan, Framing Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 
38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 917, 917 (2007). 
 65. Id. 
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State laws categorically denying voting rights to persons under 
guardianship seemingly are not narrowly tailored and in all likelihood are 
drastically overinclusive.66  Other state laws that avoid categorical restrictions 
provide less restrictive alternatives that, under the strict scrutiny analysis, must 
be implemented in place of the more restrictive option.67 
The great harm of an overinclusive capacity definition, the limited harm of 
an underinclusive capacity definition, and the constitutional requirement to 
narrowly tailor the disenfranchised class push states to whittle voting capacity 
requirements to a bare minimum.68  But even if a state establishes a suitable, 
precise voting capacity standard, it still must present a compelling interest to 
warrant the voting rights restriction.69  This Comment will consider potential 
compelling state interests in a later section.  It will now address the problem of 
discrimination destroying the intended protections of a narrowly tailored 
voting law. 
B. Discriminatory Discretion Preventing the Exercise of Voting 
As explained above, many states currently require individual capacity 
assessments to determine whether a mentally disabled individual has the 
requisite mental capacity to vote.70  Depending on the state, these 
determinations may be made by a clerk, judge, or some other professional.71 
Pervasive attitudes and stigmas that mentally disabled individuals, as a 
class, cannot think independently or make basic decisions have a strong 
likelihood of influencing a clerk’s or a judge’s determination.72  Vague 
capacity definitions are particularly susceptible to discretionary abuse and, 
 
 66. See, e.g., Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001) (holding Maine’s 
categorical disenfranchisement of individuals under guardianship “is not narrowly tailored” 
because it would disenfranchise “many more persons under guardianship” than it intended).  The 
Court indicated individuals may be placed under guardianship for reasons that would not bring 
their ability to vote into question.  Id. at 54–55. 
 67. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  Of course, a state only has to implement a 
less restrictive policy if it will serve its professed compelling interest. 
 68. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 58, at 965. 
 69. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 70. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 71. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.  See also Schriner, supra note 35, at 93–
94 (noting that allowing any professional, including psychiatrists and psychologists, to determine 
when an individual is capable to vote does not remove the influence of bias or prejudice—
professional judgments in this respect are merely “sanctified version[s] of the same underlying 
prejudice” held by lay persons). 
 72. See Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 849; see also Schriner, supra note 35, at 90 
(highlighting the American historical tendency to apply “objective” voting requirements 
discriminatorily, particularly with regard to African–Americans and women). 
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historically, have operated as “exclusionary project[s].”73  Accordingly, “A 
supposedly neutral finding of incapacity can be driven by bias and used 
instrumentally by a court or [other entity] to insure the individual in question 
behaves in a prescribed manner.”74 
Similarly, during the African–American suffrage movement in the early 
and mid-twentieth century, stigma, misconceptions about ability, and general 
distaste for African–Americans motivated the discriminatory efforts of local 
voting officials.75  The frequency and scope of voting discrimination against 
African–Americans was generally greater and more pronounced than it is 
against the mentally disabled,76 but the movement still provides a useful 
comparison for multiple reasons.  First, the African–American suffrage 
movement highlights the devastating power discrimination can have over a 
minority trying to exercise its rights.  Second, it reveals public policy options 
to address the problem of discrimination and modernize state voting laws. 
1. Discretionary Discrimination—Literacy Tests and Beyond 
All African–American men were granted the constitutional right to vote 
with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.77  However, African–
Americans, particularly in the South, were systematically denied the right to 
vote through coercion and legal obstructions.78  It was not until 1965 and the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act that the legal barriers of literacy tests and 
discriminatory practices were directly addressed and African–Americans had a 
legitimate voice at the polls.79 
Literacy tests gained popularity well before the 1960’s Civil Rights 
Movement.80  Northern states adopted literacy tests in the mid to late 1800s to 
“produce a more competent electorate” and effectively “weed out sizeable 
 
 73. Knauer, supra note 55, at 324.  Knauer notes: “The concept of legal capacity has 
traditionally been an exclusionary project under which certain classes of individuals were by 
definition incapable of legal agency.” Id.  She also states feminism and critical race studies have 
brought out a deep skepticism for the state’s protective impulses expressed through the concept of 
legal capacity.  Id. 
 74. Id. at 342. 
 75. See infra notes 77–91 and accompanying text. 
 76. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 58 
(2000). 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2; Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right 
to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 525 (1973) [hereinafter Derfner, Racial Discrimination]. 
 78. Celinda Lake, Muted Voices: A Comparative Perspective of Women’s and Blacks’ 
Voting Participation, in VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA: CONTINUING THE QUEST FOR FULL 
PARTICIPATION 129, 131 (Karen McGill Arrington & William L. Taylor eds., 1992). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Cristina M. Rodríguez, From Litigation, Legislation: A Review of Brian Landsberg’s 
Free at Last to Vote: The Alabama Origins of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 1132, 
1142–43 (2008) (book review). 
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numbers of poor immigrant voters.”81  However, in the South, literacy tests 
became a “psychological obstruction” that suppressed African–American 
voting rights because of the discriminatory practices of Southern voting 
officials and African–Americans’ inferior education.82 
Literacy tests were adopted essentially by every southern state except 
Texas and Florida.83  The tests required voter applicants to read or write any 
section of the applicable state constitution or the U.S. Constitution to the 
satisfaction of the registrar.84  Faced with concerns that literacy tests would 
disenfranchise many illiterate whites, the tests—admittedly—were never 
intended to operate honestly.85  The key to their “success” was that they were 
designed to give the local registrar “an elastic standard to implement the 
avowed intention of disenfranching blacks but not whites.”86 
Before and during the 1960s, Southern African–Americans faced what has 
been described as “[t]he grim determination of the southern politician never to 
allow [them] to take part in politics—[their] education, economic progress and 
moral fitness, notwithstanding . . . .”87  Local “princes and dukes,” the 
registrars and clerks, had total discretion to discriminate as they pleased.88  
Local white registrars would closely review African–American citizens’ 
applications and deny them for technical errors that bore no relation to the 
applicant’s qualifications.89  The same registrars that discriminated against 
African–Americans would help illiterate white voters fill out an application 
and then approve it.90  Tactics like these continued until Congress finally 
intervened.91 
 
 81. Id. at 1143.  Literacy tests were justified because voters who could not read “labor[ed] 
. . . under mental incapacity” and thus should not vote.  Id. 
 82. Id. at 1144. 
 83. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 537. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 537–38.  Senator Carter Glass was noted as saying white Southerners obey the 
letter of the Fifteenth Amendment but “frankly evade the spirit thereof—and propose to continue 
doing so.  White supremacy is too precious a thing to surrender for the sake of a theoretical 
justice that would let a brutish African deem himself the equal of white men and women in 
Dixie.”  Mary Frances Berry, Voting, Voting Rights, and Political Power in American History, in 
VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA, supra note 78, at 63, 69. 
 86. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 538. 
 87. Berry, supra note 85, at 69. 
 88. Armand Derfner, Development of the Franchise: 1957–1980, in VOTING RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA, supra note 78, at 91, 92 [hereinafter Derfner, Development of the Franchise]. 
 89. Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1143.  Some registrars failed African–American applicants 
for misspellings.  Id.  Others were prevented from voting for not reporting their age to the day, 
rather than the year.  Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 92.  In Virginia, a 
state law required that individuals fill out their registration without assistance, so Virginia 
registrars would not let African–Americans read the questions.  Id. 
 90. Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1139. 
 91. Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 92. 
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2. Federal Action and Changing Priorities 
The Department of Justice voting rights litigation that preceded the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 revealed such rights for African–Americans could not be 
secured unless the value of access to a ballot was prioritized above other 
objectives, such as ensuring an intelligent electorate.92  The litigation also 
made clear that protecting African–American voters from discrimination 
required a regulatory system that applied to all jurisdictions, rather than trying 
to protect rights in case-by-case litigation.93 
Congress directly addressed Southern officials’ intentional discrimination 
through the Voting Rights Act of 1965.94  The Act outlawed literacy tests and 
any other “test or device” to determine voter eligibility for five years.95  Also, 
and perhaps more importantly, the Act authorized the Attorney General to 
designate federal examiners to register voters and federal observers to attend 
elections if the Attorney General felt local officials were not complying with 
the Act.96  The Act’s provisions reflect the first time Congress acknowledged 
the intended discriminatory purpose of instituting literacy tests in the South.97 
While banning literacy tests was at the heart of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, the key to the Act was taking the control of the voting process out of the 
hands of local officials that had overtly discriminated for decades.98  The Act 
acknowledged African–Americans’ right to vote was a national concern that 
had to be protected at a national level.99 
 
 92. Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1146. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et 
seq. (1970)); Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 550. 
 95. Voting Rights Act, § 2, 79 Stat. 438; Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 
551. 
 96. Voting Rights Act, § 2, 79 Stat. 439, 439–41; Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 
77, at 551. 
 97. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 552. 
 98. Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 94. 
 99. Id.  President Lyndon B. Johnson was a strong advocate for the passage of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 205 (Frederick D. Drake & 
Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999).  Upon writing to Congress urging them to pass the Act, he noted the 
Constitution prohibits withholding the right to vote based on race and stated: 
We have all sworn an oath before God to support and to defend [the] Constitution . . . . 
This bill will strike down restrictions to voting in all elections . . . which have been used 
to deny Negroes the right to vote.  This bill will establish a simple, uniform standard 
which cannot be used, however ingenious the effort, to flout our Constitution . . . . There 
is no constitutional issue here.  The command of the Constitution is plain.  There is no 
moral issue, It [sic] is wrong—deadly wrong—to deny any of your fellow Americans the 
right to vote.  There is no issue of states’ rights or national rights.  There is only the 
struggle for human rights. 
Id. at 206. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
956 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:943 
The Act not only outlawed tests that were discriminatory in purpose but 
also those discriminatory in effect.100  The Supreme Court reaffirmed 
Congress’s intent in Gaston County v. United States,101 ruling North Carolina’s 
fairly administered literacy test had a discriminatory effect on African–
Americans because the county had systematically deprived African–Americans 
equal educational opportunities, leaving them unequally prepared to meet the 
test’s requirements.102  The Court held literacy tests, used as a voting 
requirement, were unconstitutional in voting districts that operated segregated 
schools.103  One could argue the Gaston decision indicated the Court 
prioritized African–Americans’ access to the ballot above ensuring an 
intelligent electorate. 
Just after Gaston, Congress passed an extension of the Voting Rights Act 
in 1970.104  The extension temporarily (and later permanently) banned literacy 
tests nationwide.105  This provision reflected the changing and increased 
appreciation for an individual’s right to vote.106  It also signified that illiterate 
people have as much right and ability to vote as anyone else.107 
Thus, two themes characterize the response to the widespread, 
discretionary voting discrimination in the early and mid twentieth century.  
First, it became clear that there was a need for a federal standard to curb the 
discriminatory exercise of discretion by local officials against African–
Americans.  Second, states and society in general recognized that ensuring an 
“educated electorate” was not, or should not be, its highest priority when 
framing voting laws.  Next, this Comment considers whether popular 
arguments for restricting the voting rights of the mentally disabled, like an 
interest in an “educated electorate,” may be a compelling state interest under 
strict scrutiny analysis. 
III.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANDING THE VOTING RIGHTS OF THE 
MENTALLY DISABLED—COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS? 
Common arguments made to deny broader voting rights for the mentally 
disabled include: (1) their disability prevents them from being full 
 
 100. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 563. 
 101. 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
 102. Id. at 296–97; see Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 563. 
 103. Gaston County, 395 U.S. at 296–97; see Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1144. 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970); see also Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 565. 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a; see also Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 
95.  In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to suspend literacy tests 
nationwide.  400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).  All the Justices agreed Congress could use a broad 
remedy for a widespread problem even if literacy tests in some areas may not be discriminatory.  
See id.; Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 566. 
 106. See Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 95. 
 107. See id. 
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participatory members of society; (2) they lack the mental capacity to 
participate in politics; and (3) their interests are vicariously represented by 
other individuals and groups acting in their best interests.108 
Each of these arguments resembles similar judgments women’s suffrage 
activists had to overcome.109  While some of these arguments may be more 
valid when applied to the mentally disabled rather than women, they still 
contain important deficiencies.  Ultimately, the arguments would not likely 
constitute or support a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny 
constitutional analysis. 
A. Challenging Traditional Notions of Societal Placement 
The historical treatment and resulting public perceptions of the mentally 
disabled gave rise to the widely held notion that mentally disabled persons 
cannot be full members of society.110  The General Provisions of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) broadly summarize some of these 
treatments and perceptions.111  Congress noted that the disabled have 
historically been isolated and segregated from the rest of society112 and have 
been subjected to “purposeful unequal treatment.”113  Congress also concluded 
that the disabled have been “relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness . . . resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative 
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, 
society.”114 
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged and recounted the “historic 
mistreatment, indifference, and hostility” resulting from notions that the 
mentally disabled could not contribute to society.115  In Olmstead v. L.C., the 
Court recognized that the institutionalization of individuals, who can receive 
appropriate treatment in a community setting, merely perpetuates unwarranted 
historical assumptions that those in institutions “are incapable or unworthy of 
participating in community life.”116  Furthermore, the Court noted that the 
 
 108. See Holmes, supra note 19. 
 109. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 110. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text. 
 111. See 42 U.S.C. §12101(a) (2006). 
 112. Id. §12101(a)(2). 
 113. Id. §12101(a)(7). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 608 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 116. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (majority opinion).  Interestingly, and perhaps to add 
perspective, the Court, like this Comment, supported its assertion regarding discrimination 
against the mentally disabled by citing comparisons, quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984), which highlighted the stigmatizing injury of racial discrimination, and Los Angeles Dept. 
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which discussed the harmful affects of 
gender discrimination arising from gender stereotypes.  Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600. 
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practical consequences of institutionalization, including diminished “social 
contacts, work options, economic independence, [and] educational 
advancement,” continue to engender stigmas against the mentally disabled.117 
The Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.118 addressed 
the “‘lengthy and tragic’ history of segregation and discrimination” of the 
mentally disabled in relation to racial discrimination against African–
Americans.119  The Court referenced state mandated “segregation and 
degradation” of the mentally disabled that “rivaled, and . . . paralleled, the 
worst excesses of Jim Crow” in “virulence and bigotry,”120 specifically citing a 
1920 Mississippi law deeming the mentally disabled “unfit for citizenship.”121  
Ultimately, the Court concluded: “Most important[ly], lengthy and continuing 
isolation of the retarded has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and 
stereotyping that long have plagued them.”122 
Like the mentally disabled, women faced isolation and limited citizenship 
in their struggle for voting rights.  Women and men who opposed women’s 
suffrage often claimed a woman’s “sphere of influence was primarily 
domestic” and politics and voting were strictly a male concern.123  Women’s 
isolation, rather than in hospitals or wards, was in their home.  Confining 
women to the “domestic sphere” was justified by arguments that women’s 
childbearing nature made them more suitable for domestic life than the 
contentious world of politics.124  The traditional conception of the family 
required a woman’s attention to children and the home while her husband 
engaged in civil activities.125 
Under this conception, women did not need to be involved in matters 
outside the home, and if they were, it “would harm the marriage relationship” 
and the entire family unit.126  Even when “suffragists invoked American 
traditions of individualism, ‘self-government,’ and ‘self-representation’ in 
 
 117. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601. 
 118. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 119. Id. at 461–64. 
 120. Id. at 462. 
 121. Id. at 463. 
 122. Id. at 464.  The Court further compared the lasting nature of racial discrimination to 
discrimination against the mentally disabled citing University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 303, 395 (1978), for its discussion of Jim Crow-era discrimination and then asserting, 
“[p]rejudice, once let loose, is not easily cabined.”  Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461, 464. 
 123. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 99, at 148. 
 124. Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking Law into Their Own Hands: Voting Women During 
Reconstruction, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 67, 68 (Donald W. 
Rogers ed., 1990). 
 125. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, 
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 979 (2002).  Historically, the chief purpose of American 
women in general was to be a wife, mother, and homemaker.  DuBois, supra note 124, at 68. 
 126. Siegel, supra note 125, at 951. 
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defense of the right to vote,” they were met with traditional concerns about 
maintaining familial roles.127 
B. Insufficient Mental Capacity 
Many believe someone with a mental health diagnosis is intrinsically 
irrational and incapable of participating in civic functions, but mental 
disabilities do not necessarily reduce a person’s intelligence.128  Many mental 
disabilities that affect social skills or ability to care for one’s self have no 
relation to a person’s ability to make decisions or understand concepts.129  
While some severe mental disabilities can inhibit individuals from making 
basic decisions or comprehension, by no means do the vast majority of people 
with mental disabilities lose these functions.130 
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would consider ensuring an 
“intelligent” electorate a compelling interest.131  In Dunn, the Court indicated 
there would be problems associated with such an interest stating, “We note that 
the criterion of ‘intelligent’ voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of 
abuse.”132  The Court also referenced the 1970 Voting Rights Act and stated, 
“Congress declared [it] federal policy that people should be allowed to vote 
even if they were not well informed about the issues.”133 
Regardless, studies and other evidence show that persons with mental 
disabilities can make reasoned judgments about political issues, which calls 
into question the validity of whether excluding them would make the electorate 
any more intelligent.134  This point gains further credence, knowing that many 
 
 127. Id. at 981. 
 128. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850. 
 129. See, e.g., Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 88–89 (giving multiple examples of evidence 
that the mentally disabled are capable of making sound political decisions); see also Robert M. 
Levy & Leonard S. Rubenstein, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 292 (1996) 
(citing a study that showed almost all individuals in a psychiatric hospital who had diagnoses of 
psychotic or major affective disorders held opinions about the 1991 Gulf War similar to those of 
the American public).  For example, Sebastian Go registered to vote and researched political 
races when he turned eighteen despite being under guardianship for bipolar disorder, Asperger’s 
syndrome, and brain injury.  Pam Belluck, States Face Decisions on Who Is Mentally Fit to Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19, 2007, at A1.  His mother noted just because he needs someone to manage 
his money and make his medical decisions does not mean Sebastian cannot make a political 
decision.  Id. 
 130. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850. 
 131. Schriner, supra note 35, at 87. 
 132. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 356 (1972).  The Court explicitly stated it was not 
“deciding as a general matter the extent to which a state can bar less knowledgeable or intelligent 
citizens from the franchise.”  Id. 
 133. Id. at 357 n.29. 
 134. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 89.  Examples include institutionalized individuals 
endorsing a candidate for governor due in part to his commitment to disability rights, and a study 
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voters have little knowledge of the issues and make choices based on 
emotional reactions and other “irrational judgments.”135 
Women also faced arguments that they were “too unintelligent, [and] too 
uninformed” to exercise political judgment.136  Those spearheading the 
women’s suffrage movement, like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, asserted that 
women were not intellectually inferior to men and could participate in 
politics.137  Yet, to many, women “lacked the capacity for managing public 
affairs.”138  Only citizens with the “requisite degree of independence to vote 
their own judgment” had the “capacity” to vote responsibly.139  Women, 
beholden to their husbands and relegated to a strict familial role, were not so 
“independent.”140  There were additional concerns that, if burdened with duties 
outside the home, women could not fulfill their obligations in the home.141 
These broad characterizations about women’s capabilities are now “almost 
entirely absent from public thought” but still bear a striking resemblance to 
“the assumptions underlying voting prohibitions on persons with cognitive and 
emotional impairments.”142 
C. Virtual Representation 
Finally, people have argued that persons under guardianship can be 
politically represented by their guardian, who is professionally responsible for 
working in the individual’s best interest.  This argument guarantees mentally 
disabled persons the status of a second-rate citizen and ignores the 
 
that found the voting patterns of mentally disabled individuals were strongly related to 
socioeconomic factors.  Id. at 88–89. 
 135. Id. at 89.  The government has recognized since the Federalist Papers that voters often 
behave selfishly, prejudicially, and irrationally.  Karlan, supra note 64, at 925.  The fact that 
mentally disabled individuals may not process information in a sophisticated or entirely rational 
manner may separate them only in degree, if at all, from the rest of the electorate.  Id.  Schriner, 
Ochs, and Shields thus conclude: “It cannot be argued, therefore, that people with cognitive or 
emotional disabilities should be prevented from voting simply because they are presumed to be 
incapable of gathering, comprehending, and applying the information necessary to act 
intelligently, given that the vast majority of other voters appear to be similarly ‘handicapped.’”  
Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 89.  See also Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850 (“During the 
1992 presidential campaign, 86 percent of the American people knew that George Bush’s dog’s 
name was Millie, but only 15 percent were aware that both he and Bill Clinton supported the 
death penalty.”). 
 136. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 90. 
 137. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 99, at 147–48.  In fact, to 
prove her point, Ms. Stanton ran for Congress.  Id. at 148. 
 138. Siegel, supra note 125, at 979. 
 139. Id. at 980. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 979. 
 142. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 90. 
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foundational American value of individual independence.143  Ordway 
concludes that “a democratic government’s authority derives from the people,” 
and voting is the vehicle to grant such authority.144  Displacing the right to vote 
not only limits the accountability of elected officials to the people, but it 
“undermines the people’s ability to check the performance of their elected 
officials.”145  Absent this safeguard, “the entire democratic enterprise loses its 
legitimacy.”146 
Also, professionals acting politically on behalf of the mentally disabled are 
often motivated by compassion and sympathy rather than for advocacy of 
rights based protections against majoritarian action.147  It is short sighted to 
believe that guardians or other professionals would provide a suitable 
democratic check on elected officials from the minority group perspective of a 
mentally disabled individual.148 
In the women’s suffrage context, the theory of virtual representation arose 
from the traditional conception that the family was a “reasonable unit of 
political representation.”149  The notion that women’s political interests were 
represented by their husbands was the impetus for the women’s suffrage 
movement.150  This belief reflected societal norms from the time of the 
Founding Fathers, which extended well into the twentieth century, that women 
only tended to intra-family matters.151  In 1866, a United States Congressman 
stated: “[T]he women of America vote by faithful and true representatives, 
their husbands, their brothers, their sons; and no true man will go to the polls 
and deposit his ballot without remembering the true and loving constituency 
that he has at home.”152 
It was understood that if the men in a family had a right to vote, the women 
were represented.153  Ultimately, despite sharing a lack of voting rights with 
African–Americans, women were viewed to be in a much better position than 
African–Americans: “[White women] are in high fellowship with those that do 
govern, who, to a great extent, act as their agents, their friends, promoting their 
 
 143. Id. at 82 (discussing the “troubling” suggestion that professionals could serve as political 
proxies for the mentally disabled). 
 144. Ordway, supra note 40, at 1188. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 83.  See also Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850 (stating 
broadening the franchise would increase the political clout of the mentally disabled as a class 
which could help improve the terribly insufficient institutional and community-based mental 
health services). 
 148. Schriner, supra note 35, at 83. 
 149. Siegel, supra note 125, at 984. 
 150. Id. at 948. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 985–86 (citation omitted). 
 153. Id. at 981. 
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interests in every vote they give, and therefore communities get along very 
well without conferring [voting rights] upon the female.”154 
Uncomforted, the leaders of the suffrage movement challenged the notion 
of virtual representation.155  In an 1871 Petition to Congress to appear in person 
and claim their right to vote, the suffragists stated: “[W]omen who are allowed 
no vote and therefore no representation cannot truly be heard except as 
congress shall open its doors to us in person.”156  The suffragists focused on 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to “all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States.”157  They argued, as persons, women were 
equal citizens to men and that voting was one of the “privileges and 
immunities” of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.158  But this 
argument and the others were generally rebuked until the Nineteenth 
Amendment was finally ratified in 1920, granting women the equal right to 
vote.159 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO MODERNIZE RESTRICTIVE VOTING LAWS 
This Comment has identified some of the major problems with current 
state laws that disenfranchise the mentally disabled under a strict scrutiny 
constitutional analysis: (1) the difficulties of trying to define capacity, (2) 
vague categorical language susceptible to discretionary discrimination, and (3) 
deficient arguments supporting broad disenfranchisement.  It has also 
repeatedly highlighted the general public’s deeply rooted prejudices and 
misconceptions regarding the mental abilities of the mentally disabled that 
underlie many current restrictive voting laws. 
In 2007, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates 
approved a Voting Recommendation that combats many of the problems noted 
above.160  The ABA writes: 
 
 154. Siegel, supra note 125, at 985. 
 155. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 99, at 148–49. 
 156. Id. at 149. 
 157. DuBois, supra note 124, at 70. 
 158. Id. at 72.  The anti-suffragists tried to keep Congress from paying attention to the 
suffragists’ requests as long as possible.  STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra 
note 99, at 163.  During World War I, anti-suffragists petitioned Congress to ignore the suffrage 
issue until after the war, claiming the suffrage movement was “harassing . . . its public men and 
. . . distracting . . . its people from work for the war . . . .”  Id. at 163. 
 159. Siegel, supra note 125, at 952–53.  In addition to their constitutional arguments focused 
on individualism, suffragists argued that virtual representation effectively created a status 
inequality based on sex, making “all men sovereigns and all women subjects.”  Id. at 990.  While 
the focus of suffragists’ arguments changed to a degree as the movement evolved, id. at 993, their 
underlying message steadfastly remained consistent: that “men could not and did not represent 
women” at the polls.  Id. at 991. 
 160. ABA Recommendation, supra note 9, at 1. 
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State constitutions and statutes that permit exclusion of a person from voting 
on the basis of mental incapacity, including guardianship and election laws, 
should explicitly state that the right to vote is retained, except by court order 
where the following criteria must be met: 
(1) The exclusion is based on a determination by a court of competent 
jurisdiction; 
(2) Appropriate due process protections have been afforded; 
(3) The court finds that the person cannot communicate, with or without 
accommodations, a specific desire to participate in the voting process; and 
(4) The findings are established by clear and convincing evidence.161 
First, this Recommendation eliminates categorical disenfranchisement 
based on guardianship.  Mentally disabled persons who have successfully 
registered to vote are presumed, like all other registered citizens, to have the 
right to vote unlike those current state laws that presume individuals under 
guardianship do not have the right to vote.162 
Second, the Recommendation requires a court order to take away an 
individual’s right to vote.  This provision prevents partisan poll workers or 
local election officials from refusing to allow registered individuals to vote, 
mitigating the potential affects of discriminatory discretion rooted in societal 
prejudice and misconceptions.163 
Third, the ABA’s Recommendation further limits the potential affects of 
prejudice and misconception by requiring a relatively simple, straightforward 
judicial determination.  Whether one can communicate a specific desire to 
participate in the electoral process is surely easier to decipher than whether one 
has the “capacity to vote” as defined by most current state laws.  But this 
standard is still susceptible to some discretionary discrimination, particularly 
with regard to what constitutes a “specific” desire to participate.  Nonetheless, 
this standard is a clear improvement over most current states’ capacity 
requirements.164 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.  Most states have laws that allow certain 
individuals to challenge the qualifications of a potential voter prior to or on the day of an election.  
See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, VOTER CHALLENGE STATUTES BY STATE, 
(2008), http://www.bazelon.org/pdf/voterchallengelaws10-08.pdf; see also Heather S. 
Heidelbaugh et al., Protecting the Integrity of the Polling Place: A Constitutional Defense of Poll 
Watcher Statutes, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 219 (2009) (focusing on private “poll watchers” 
and arguing they play a useful role on election process).  A discussion of “voter challenge” laws 
is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 164. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, the potential for 
discrimination can never be completely eliminated.  Discrimination efforts will change depending 
on how people determine they can best get around the law.  See Derfner, Racial Discrimination, 
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The Recommendation also would seemingly come closer to meeting the 
“narrowly tailored” requirement of the strict scrutiny test than most current 
state laws.165  It incorporates protective language from the ADA, “with or 
without reasonable accommodation,”166 a less ambiguous standard than 
“capacity to vote,” and imparts a high evidentiary burden, “clear and 
convincing evidence,” to take away the individual’s right to vote.  These 
provisions would appear to greatly limit the over-inclusion that is a hallmark of 
many current state laws. 
Lastly, the Recommendation serves a state’s interest to preserve the 
integrity of the electoral process.167  The recommendation simply requires a 
reaffirmation of the desire to vote that every citizen gives each time he or she 
registers to vote or visits the polls.  Thus, the general requirements that states 
enforce on all voters are uncompromised.  Furthermore, state laws that prohibit 
fraud and coercion would continue to operate as the least restrictive methods, 
as required under the strict scrutiny analysis, guarding against contamination of 
the electoral process.168 
In general, the ABA Recommendation appears to make reasonable 
improvements upon the problems most current state voting laws present.  Yet 
in light of the African–American and women’s suffrage historical examples, 
two additional recommendations are worthy of consideration. 
First, the term “specific,” as noted above, seemingly presents a good 
opportunity for judicial discretion affected by prejudice and misconception to 
rear its ugly head.  Though the ABA recommendation does not offer particular 
guidance regarding what may be considered a “specific desire” to participate, 
its stated objective is “to not treat people any differently in voting rights based 
on any perceived impairment or other personal characteristic.”169  Yet, despite 
this clearly stated non-discriminatory intent, the experiences of African–
Americans and women remind us of the destructive power discrimination can 
have when discriminatory efforts are rooted in traditional prejudices and 
misconceptions.  Differentiating between a “general desire” and a “specific 
desire” provides a convenient vehicle for continued discriminatory discretion.  
 
supra note 77, at 552–53 (noting discrimination against African–Americans “shifted” after The 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 from voter registration to vote dilution). 
 165. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 166. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006). 
 167. The Supreme Court has ruled that states have a compelling interest under the strict 
scrutiny analysis to ensure elections are free from undue influence and fraud.  Schriner et al., 
supra note 35, at 92. 
 168. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Schriner, supra note 35, at 92 (noting 
prohibiting mentally disabled individuals from voting for fears their votes will be easily 
influenced or manipulated is not the least restrictive method available for combating these 
improprieties). 
 169. ABA Recommendation, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
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Thus, given the widely held prejudice and misconceptions regarding the 
abilities of the mentally disabled, the Recommendation would likely better 
serve its stated objective if it removed the term “specific” from its provision. 
Second, the ABA Recommendation is an initial step in the direction the 
African–American and women’s suffrage movements took to ultimately 
achieve their goals—that is, to garner federal attention and seek federal 
legislative action.  This same direction may be the path to effectively broaden 
the voting rights of the mentally disabled.  Trying to secure voting rights for 
African–Americans through litigation proved largely unsuccessful compared to 
the change brought by The Voting Rights Act of 1965.170  Women lobbied 
vehemently to appear before Congress knowing the federal legislature was the 
key to attaining the right to vote.171  The mentally disabled face widespread 
prejudice amongst local citizens and restrictive laws with deep roots, which 
mirror the barriers African–Americans and women have faced.  Similarly, 
federal action may have to replace litigation and state referenda in an effort to 
overcome deeply ingrained prejudices and misconceptions overly restricting 
the voting rights of the mentally disabled.172 
CONCLUSION 
“The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for 
breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men 
because they are different.”173  The mentally disabled is one of two classes of 
individuals that states are specifically permitted by federal law to 
disenfranchise.  Many current state laws contain antiquated, stigmatic terms, 
and overly broad provisions that perpetuate prejudices and misconceptions 
about the mentally disabled and unduly restrict their right to vote. 
All restrictive state voting laws must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest to be constitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis.  
The discrimination faced by African–Americans seeking to vote during the 
early and mid-twentieth century and the arguments made to prevent women 
from voting prior to the Nineteenth Amendment parallel discrimination and 
 
 170. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 550. 
 171. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 172. Congressional action regarding voting issues is not relegated to the distant past.  
Congress recently addressed voting issues related to the disabled in the 2002 Help America Vote 
Act which provides for educating election officials, poll workers, and volunteers about the voting 
rights of the disabled as part of a broad effort to improve voting systems nationwide.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 15301 (2006); Arlene Kanter & Rebecca Russo, The Right of People with Disabilities to 
Exercise Their Right to Vote Under the Help America Vote Act, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 852, 852 (2006). 
 173. Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the Racial Gap in Lost 
Votes, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 (2006) (quoting Lyndon Baines Johnson’s comments at the signing 
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965) (citation omitted). 
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arguments faced by the mentally disabled seeking the right to vote today.  
These themes reflect the underlying impetus of many states’ voting laws that 
overly restrict mentally disabled individuals from voting and would likely not 
pass the strict scrutiny test. 
The ABA recently published a Recommendation for modernizing state 
laws that restrict the voting rights of the mentally disabled.  While the 
Recommendation provides a step towards positive reform, additional efforts, 
likely from the federal government, will be required to overcome traditional 
prejudices and misconceptions about the abilities of the mentally disabled.  
Ultimately, “the equal right to vote will be protected only if our nation believes 
in it.”174 
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